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 Youth as Victims and Offenders in the 
Criminal Justice System: A Charter 
Analysis — Recognizing Vulnerability 
Nicholas Bala 
I. INTRODUCTION: RECOGNIZING THE SPECIAL NATURE OF YOUTH 
Although it is not always well articulated by judges, the Canadian 
courts have recognized that youth1 have a special status in the criminal 
justice system, one that is reflected in legislation and international law 
and that should also be reflected in the interpretation of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.2 Youth have limited capacities and 
greater vulnerability than adults, and are therefore given a special legal 
status. In the context of their relationships with police and in the youth 
courts, this has meant that judges have recognized that youth are entitled 
to special protections, and hence should be granted enhanced rights 
under the Charter compared to adults; the courts have also upheld the 
constitutional validity of legislation that affords youth special protections. 
In other contexts, however, the courts have held that the special 
vulnerability of youth means that adult caregivers, such as parents and 
school officials, have special powers in regard to them; accordingly, the 
Charter has also been interpreted in a way that has limited the rights of 
youth, in the belief that this is necessary to protect their interests. 
This paper reviews some of the leading Charter decisions about youth 
in the criminal justice system, first examining cases in which youth are 
charged with offences, and then considering cases that deal with them as 
victims and witnesses. The focus will be on Charter jurisprudence, though 
                                                                                                            

 Professor, Faculty of Law, Queen’s University.  
1
 A note on terminology: in this paper, the term “child” will generally be used to refer to 
persons under the age of 12, and “youth” to refer to those 12 to 17 years inclusive. This is the way 
that the terms are generally used in Canada’s criminal justice laws, most notably the Youth Criminal 
Justice Act, S.C. 2002, c. 1. In some contexts, however, the terms “youth” and “child” are used  
synonymously to refer to persons under the age of 18.  
2
 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 (hereinafter “the Charter”).  
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there will be references to the United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of the Child,3 an international treaty that the Canadian courts have 
considered in interpreting the Charter and Canadian legislation.4 
A number of significant constitutional decisions have recognized the 
vulnerability and special nature of youth, but the most important decision 
will only be rendered by the Supreme Court after this paper has been 
sent to the publisher, in a case dealing with the constitutional validity of 
provisions that create a presumption of adult sentencing for youth found 
guilty of certain very serious offences. Though there are intellectual risks 
in predicting how the Court will deal with issues, in this paper I argue 
that its prior decisions suggest that the Court will continue to recognize 
that youth is a distinct phase of life that is entitled to special recognition 
under the Charter by always placing an onus on the state to establish 
why a young offender should be treated as an adult. 
II. YOUTH AS OFFENDERS 
It is interesting to observe that the 1984 repeal of the Juvenile 
Delinquents Act,5 originally enacted in 1908 to deal with youths who 
violate the criminal law, was prompted in part by the coming into force 
of the Charter. The JDA created a highly discretionary juvenile justice 
regime which gave little attention to legal rights of youth. While the 
deficencies of the JDA were becoming apparent by the mid-1960s,6 it 
was not until 1984 that the Young Offenders Act7 replaced the JDA. Soon 
after the Charter came into effect in 1982, parts of the JDA were subject 
to successful Charter challenge, and more challenges would have followed 
if the JDA had not been repealed.8 A strong impetus for the enactment of 
the YOA was the constitutional entrenchment of the Charter in 1982. 
                                                                                                            
3
 Can. T.S. 1992 No. 3.  
4
 The Convention on the Rights of the Child, Can. T.S. 1992 No. 3 has also been influential 
in the United States, which is not a signatory. The Convention was cited in Roper v. Simmons,  
125 S.Ct. 1183 (2005), where the United States Supreme Court held that imposing the death penalty 
on a person who was under the age of 18 at the time of committing a murder was “cruel and 
unusual punishment” and hence a violation of the American Constitution. This important decision 
recognized the vulnerability and special status of youth, relying in part on international law. 
5
 First enacted as S.C. 1908, c. 40; subject to minor amendments over the years, finally as 
Juvenile Delinquents Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. J-3 [hereinafter “JDA”]. 
6
 See, e.g., Canada, Department of Justice, Report of the Committee on Juvenile Delinquency, 
Juvenile Delinquency in Canada (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1965). 
7
 R.S.C. 1985, c. Y-1, enacted as S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c. 110 [hereinafter “YOA”]. 
8
 Nicholas Bala, “Constitutional Challenges Mark Demise of Juvenile Delinquents Act” 
(1983) 30 C.R. (3d) 245. 
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The informality and lack of legal rights for youths under the JDA were 
inconsistent with the legal protections recognized in the Charter, while 
the interprovincial variation allowed by the JDA for such issues as the 
commencement of adulthood was contrary to the equal protection of the 
law guaranteed by section 15 of the Charter. 
The YOA established a uniform national age jurisdiction of 12 through 
to the 18th birthday, and provided much greater recognition for the legal 
rights of youth, developments consistent with the emphasis in the Charter 
on due process of law and equal treatment under the law.9 The YOA and 
its successor, the Youth Criminal Justice Act,10 which came into force  
in 2003, afford youth significant statutory protections, for example, in 
granting rights to youth during police questioning and for access to 
appointed counsel. These statutory rights reflect legislative recognition 
of the vulnerability of youth and of the need to treat their vulnerability 
in a fashion that promotes their rehabilitation. In a practical sense, in 
many situations involving youth, counsel and the courts do not have to 
explicitly consider the Charter, as Parliament has afforded youth substantial 
statutory protections beyond those guaranteed under the Charter. 
1. A Constitutional Right for Youth Not to Be Treated as Adults? 
In 2003, the Quebec Court of Appeal in Québec (Ministre de la Justice) 
c. Canada (Ministre de la Justice),11 held that section 72(2) of the YCJA,12 
which places an “onus” on a youth found guilty of a “presumptive offence” 
to satisfy the court as to why an adult sentence should not be imposed,  
is unconstitutional, as it violates section 7 of the Charter. Two 2006 
appellate judgments, R. v. B. (D.)13 of the Ontario Court of Appeal and  
                                                                                                            
9
 R.S.C. 1985, c. Y-1. Some critics have decried the increased emphasis on due process 
and legal rights. See, for example, J. Hackler, “An Impressionistic View of Canadian Juvenile Justice: 
1965 to 1999” (2001) 20 Can. J. Comm. Mental Health 17, at 17-21, who writes that the enactment 
of the YOA represented:  
a basic change . . . a transfer of influence from social workers to lawyers. Juveniles got certain 
legal protections, but we did not foresee that the juveniles and their families would become 
victims of the legal process. . . . The vast increase in the number of judges, prosecutors, 
defence lawyers and closed-custody institutions is the result of one profession, law, expanding 
into an area previously dominated by another, social work . . . but it is too late to go back. 
Lawyers have replaced social workers as the main players in juvenile justice. 
10
 S.C. 2002, c. 1, Royal Assent February 19, 2002, in force April 1, 2003 [hereinafter “YCJA”]. 
11
 [2003] J.Q. no 2850, 10 C.R. (6th) 281 (Que. C.A.) [hereinafter “Québec c. Canada”]. 
12
 S.C. 2002, c. 1. 
13
 [2006] O.J. No. 1112, 37 C.R. (6th) 265 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal allowed [2006] 
S.C.C.A. No. 195 (S.C.C.). 
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R. v. T. (K.D.)14 of the British Columbia Court of Appeal, came to opposite 
conclusions about the constitutionality of section 72(2). The question of 
the constitutional validity of this provision will be resolved by the 
Supreme Court of Canada when it renders its judgment on the Crown’s 
appeal from the Ontario decision some time in 2008.15 That judgment is 
likely to be one of the most significant decisions related to youth in 
Canadian history, as the question of whether the Charter requires that 
youthful offenders are to be treated in a way that takes greater account 
of their needs than adult offenders is related to the fundamental question 
of whether the Charter requires distinctive treatment of youth. 
Central to the arguments about the unconstitutionality of section 
72(2) of the YCJA16 is the interpretative significance of the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child17 for section 7 of the Charter. Article 37 of the 
Convention deals with confinement of youth, emphasizing that custody 
is to be a “last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time”, 
while Article 40 establishes principles that are to govern responses to 
offending by “children” (all those under 18 years of age), placing an 
emphasis on rehabilitation. The Convention does not deal explicitly with 
the imposition of adult sentences for youth, though Article 37(a) 
prohibits capital punishment for those who were juveniles at the time of 
commission of an offence, and Article 37(c) specifies that “every child 
deprived of liberty shall be separated from adults unless it is considered 
in the child’s best interest not to do so.” When Canada ratified the  
Convention it filed a reservation to Article 37(c), stipulating that it did 
not view itself as bound by this provision; the reservation was filed 
because the provisions of Canada’s youth justice laws — both then and 
now — do not use a “best interests” test for determining whether a youth 
should be placed in custody with adults.18 
                                                                                                            
14
 [2006] B.C.J. No. 253, 37 C.R. (6th) 243 (B.C.C.A.). 
15
 [2006] S.C.C.A. 195 (S.C.C.), appeal argued October 10, 2007. For a fuller discussion 
of some of the issues in this case, see Nicholas Bala, “Charter Challenges to Presumptive Adult 
Sentences for Serious Youth Offenders” (2006) 37 C.R. (6th) 287.  
16
 S.C. 2002, c. 1. 
17
 Can. T.S. 1992 No. 3. 
18
 Under s. 30(4) of the YCJA, S.C. 2002, c. 1, a youth may be detained with adults before 
adjudication if the youth court considers that this would be “in the best interests of the young 
person or in the public interest” (emphasis added). Under s. 76(2) a court may order a youth who is 
subject to an adult sentence and under 18 years of age is to be confined with adults, if this is 
considered by the court to be in the “best interests” of the youth or necessary for the “safety of 
others”. Subsection 76(2) creates a presumption that a young person subject to an adult sentence 
will be placed in an adult facility once he or she reaches the age of 18 years. 
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The Convention on the Rights of the Child19 does not afford individual 
Canadian youth any remedies, or create directly enforceable rights. 
However, in its 1999 decision in Baker v. Canada,20 the Supreme Court 
of Canada held that the Convention should be used to assist in the 
interpretation of legislation. Further, as will be discussed below, subsequent 
decisions of the Supreme Court make clear that the Convention may be 
cited to help interpret the Charter, in particular to give meaning to the 
“principles of fundamental justice”. 
(a) The Quebec Court of Appeal Decision 
Prior to the YCJA21 coming into effect, the Attorney General of Quebec 
brought a reference case before the Quebec Court of Appeal, arguing 
that some provisions of the YCJA, including those governing adult 
sentencing and the publication of identifying information about young 
offenders, are incompatible with international law and in violation of the 
Charter. In March 2003, a five-judge panel of the Court of Appeal 
rendered its decision in Québec c. Canada,22 holding that the “principles 
of fundamental justice” in section 7 of the Charter include the right of 
juveniles to treatment separate from adults. The Court based its approach 
to section 7 of the Charter both on the long history of special treatment 
of juvenile offenders in the Canadian justice system and on international 
law, in particular the Convention on the Rights of the Child.23 The Court 
ruled that the “principles of fundamental justice” include recognition that: 
(1) The treatment of young offenders in the criminal justice system must 
be separate and different from the treatment of adults. 
(2) Rehabilitation, not repression and deterrence, must be the basis of 
legislative and judicial intervention involving young offenders. 
(3) The youth justice system must restrict disclosure of the identity  
of minors in order to prevent stigmatization, which could limit 
rehabilitation. 
                                                                                                            
19
 Can. T.S. 1992 No. 3. 
20
 [1999] S.C.J. No. 39, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 (S.C.C.). 
21
 S.C. 2002, c. 1. 
22
 Québec (Ministre de la Justice) c. Canada (Ministre de la Justice), [2003] J.Q. no 2850, 
10 C.R. (6th) 281 (Que. C.A.). 
23
 Québec (Ministre de la Justice) c. Canada (Ministre de la Justice), [2003] J.Q. no 2850, 
10 C.R. (6th) 281, at paras. 3 and 231 (Que. C.A.). Convention on the Rights of the Child, Can. T.S. 
1992 No. 3. 
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(4) The youth justice system must consider the best interests of the 
child.24 
Some of these principles are very broad (and, as discussed below, the 
fourth seems inconsistent with subsequent Supreme Court jurisprudence), 
but the Quebec Court of Appeal limited the effect of these principles by 
engaging in an internal balancing exercise within section 7 when applying 
them. Consistent with prior Supreme Court of Canada section 7 Charter 
jurisprudence,25 the Court of Appeal held that these principles must be 
applied so as to strike a “certain balance” between the public’s right to 
be protected and the right of young people to be treated differently from 
adults and to have rehabilitation as the main focus of decisions that 
concern them.26 
The Quebec Court of Appeal ruled unconstitutional section 72(2) of 
the YCJA,27 which places an onus on youths 14 years of age or older, 
and found guilty of a “presumptive offence”, to justify why they should 
be sentenced as youths rather than as adults. The Court concluded that 
this provision places an “excessive burden [on youth], considering the 
vulnerability of the young persons on whom it rests and the purposes” of 
the YCJA.28 While the Court accepted that, in some very serious youth 
cases, an adult sentence may be appropriate, the Court held that section 7 
of the Charter requires that in every case the onus should be on the 
Crown to justify the denial of youth status. 
In May 2003, in response to the Quebec Court of Appeal judgment, 
the then federal Liberal government announced that the decision would 
not be appealed, and that the government would “soon” introduce 
amendments to the YCJA29 to make the Act consistent with that decision. 
The purpose of these amendments would have been to ensure a uniform 
                                                                                                            
24
 Québec (Ministre de la Justice) c. Canada (Ministre de la Justice), [2003] J.Q. no 2850, 
10 C.R. (6th) 281, at paras. 215 and 231 (Que. C.A.). 
25
 See Cunningham v. Canada, [1993] S.C.J. No. 47, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 143 (S.C.C.). The 
concept of “internal balancing” is distinguished from the “external balancing” that results when s. 1 
of the Charter is invoked.  
26
 Québec (Ministre de la Justice) c. Canada (Ministre de la Justice), [2003] J.Q. no 2850, 
10 C.R. (6th) 281, at para. 237 (Que. C.A.). 
27
 S.C. 2002, c. 1. 
28
 Québec (Ministre de la Justice) c. Canada (Ministre de la Justice), [2003] J.Q. no 2850, 
10 C.R. (6th) 281, at para. 249 (Que. C.A.). The Court of Appeal also held that s. 110(2)(b) of the 
YCJA, S.C. 2002, c. 1 which allows courts to permit identifying publicity about youths convicted 
of presumptive offences but who receive youth sentences rather than adult sentences, violates s. 7 
of the Charter.  
29
 S.C. 2002, c. 1. 
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national response, and to resolve procedural issues about how and when 
an adult sentence can be imposed. In fact, legislative amendments were 
not introduced, and this type of legislative reform will not be considered 
until after the Supreme Court deals with this issue. 
(b) The British Columbia Court of Appeal: R. v. T. (K.D.) 
In its January 2006 decision in R. v. T. (K.D.),30 the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal declined to follow the decision of the Quebec Court of 
Appeal, and upheld the constitutional validity of section 72(2), placing 
an onus on a youth to justify not having an adult sentence in a manslaughter 
case. The British Columbia Court held that section 7 of the Charter does 
not include as a principle of fundamental justice that young offenders 
are presumptively to be treated differently from adults. In the case 
before the Court, it reversed the trial judge and concluded that the youth 
should receive an adult sentence. 
One important reason that the British Columbia Court gave for 
rejecting the approach of the Quebec Court31 was that the fourth 
“principle of fundamental justice” which the Quebec Court recognized, 
that the youth court system must make decisions that “consider the best 
interests of the child”, is inconsistent with the 2004 decision of the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth 
and the Law v. Canada.32 In that decision, McLachlin C.J.C. wrote for 
the majority, upholding the constitutional validity of section 43 of the 
Criminal Code,33 which authorizes use of reasonable force for the purpose 
of the correction of children. In the course of her judgment, she concluded 
that requiring decisions to be made in accordance with the “best interests 
of the child” is not a principle of fundamental justice. 
While it is true that this fourth principle — the best interests principle 
— was rejected by the Supreme Court in Canadian Foundation for 
Children,34 the Quebec Court did not even mention this particular principle 
in dealing with the Charter challenges to sections 72(2) and 110(2), but 
rather focused on the first two of the principles — that youths must be 
                                                                                                            
30
 [2006] B.C.J. No. 253, 37 C.R. (6th) 243 (B.C.C.A.). 
31
 R. v. T. (K.D.), [2006] B.C.J. No. 253, 37 C.R. (6th) 243, at para. 29 (B.C.C.A.). 
32
 [2004] S.C.J. No. 6, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Canadian Foundation for 
Children”]. 
33
 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
34
 Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law , [2004] S.C.J. No. 6, [2004]  
1 S.C.R. 76 (S.C.C.). 
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treated separately from adults and in a way that focuses on their 
rehabilitation. 
Another argument that the British Columbia Court of Appeal 
considered significant is that section 72(2) of the YCJA35 does not place 
an onerous burden on the convicted youth. The British Columbia Court 
quoted from an Ontario trial decision (now overruled in Ontario), R. v. 
L. (D.) (No. 2), where Duncan J. wrote: 
… the significance of onus in the scheme under consideration can be 
over-stated. At the end of the day, the Court will either be satisfied 
that an appropriate sentence can be achieved under the youth system 
or that it can not — and will decide accordingly.36 
In taking this approach to section 72(2), both the British Columbia Court 
of Appeal and Duncan J. in R. v. L. (D.) (No. 2)37 placed significant 
emphasis on an interpretation given to the transfer provision of the 
YOA38 by the Supreme Court of Canada in its 1989 decision in R. v. M. 
(S.H.), where McLachlin J. wrote: 
 I share the view that application of the concepts of burden and onus 
to the transfer provisions of the Young Offenders Act may not be helpful. 
..... 
Nor do I find it helpful to cast the issue in terms of a civil or criminal 
standard of proof. Those concepts are typically concerned with establishing 
whether something took place. … But it is less helpful to ask oneself 
whether a young person should be tried in ordinary court “on a balance 
of probabilities”. One is not talking about something which is probable 
or improbable when one enters into the exercise of … weighing and 
balancing all the relevant considerations, [to decide whether] … the case 
should be transferred to ordinary court.39 
It is submitted that this passage is not relevant for deciding about the 
interpretation or constitutionality of section 72(2) of the YCJA,40 since 
the Court in R. v. M. (S.H.) was discussing the 1984 version of the YOA, 
which placed no onus on any party at a transfer hearing, but simply 
                                                                                                            
35
 S.C. 2002, c. 1. 
36
 [2005] O.J. No. 3183, at para. 12 (Ont. C.J.), per Duncan J. Quoted at para. 58 by the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal in R. v. T. (K.D.), [2006] B.C.J. No. 253, 37 C.R. (6th) 243 (B.C.C.A.).  
37
 R. v. L. (D.) (No. 2), [2005] O.J. No. 3183 (Ont. C.J.). 
38
 R.S.C. 1985, c. Y-1. 
39
 [1989] S.C.J. No. 93, 50 C.C.C. (3d) 503, at 546 (S.C.C.), quoted by the Court of 
Appeal in R. v. T. (K.D.), [2006] B.C.J. No. 253, 37 C.R. (6th) 243, at para. 59 (B.C.C.A.). 
40
 S.C. 2002, c. 1. 
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stated that the youth court was to be “satisfied” that transfer should occur. 
It was only in 1995 that the YOA was amended to introduce the concept 
of “onus”,41 and, in regard to the most serious presumptive offences, to 
place an onus on youth to satisfy the court why a youth should not be 
tried as an adult. It is that onus provision, continued in the YCJA section 
72(2), which is the subject of controversy. 
It is true that in practice, even if the onus is on the Crown, in most 
cases the youth is still likely to adduce evidence about his background 
and character, and to attempt to establish that he is likely to be rehabilitated 
within the youth justice system. It would seem wrong to place any reliance 
on the fact that in some cases the issue of onus may be practically 
insignificant. There are clearly cases in which the issue of onus may be 
determinative, and R. v. T. (K.D.)42 may well be one of them. It is notable 
that in R. v. T. (K.D.) the trial judge found that section 72(2) was 
unconstitutional, placed an onus on the Crown, and decided not to 
impose an adult sentence, while the Court of Appeal upheld the 
constitutionality of the provision, placed an onus on the youth, and imposed 
an adult sentence. 
(c) The Ontario Court of Appeal: R. v. B. (D.) 
Just six weeks after the British Columbia Court of Appeal decision 
in R. v. T. (K.D.),43 the Ontario Court of Appeal rendered its contrary 
decision in R. v. B. (D.),44 agreeing with the 2003 Quebec Court of 
Appeal ruling that section 72(2) of the YCJA45 violates section 7 of the 
Charter. The Ontario decision discussed the importance of the section 
72(2) onus, concluding that it is “significant”, involving both a tactical 
onus of adducing evidence and a burden of persuasion, and observing 
that for presumptive offences, the Crown might succeed in having an 
adult sentence imposed even if it introduced no evidence or argument to 
                                                                                                            
41
 YOA, R.S.C. 1985, c. Y-1, s. 16(1.1), as enacted by S.C. 1995, c. 19. 
42
 [2006] B.C.J. No. 253, 37 C.R. (6th) 243 (B.C.C.A.). 
43
 [2006] B.C.J. No. 253, 37 C.R. (6th) 243 (B.C.C.A.). 
44
 [2006] O.J. No. 1112, 37 C.R. (6th) 265 (Ont. C.A.). The Ontario decision also followed 
the Quebec judgment in ruling that s. 110(2) of the YCJA, S.C. 2002, c. 1 violates the s. 7 Charter 
rights of a youth, by imposing on the youth found guilty of a presumptive offence but not subject to 
adult sanction the onus to justify a ban on the publication of identifying information. Although not 
mentioned by the Ontario Court, publication of identifying information about young offenders not 
only stigmatizes them, it may also make their rehabilitation more difficult, making a s. 1 argument 
even more difficult for this provision. 
45
 S.C. 2002, c. 1. 
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justify this result.46 The Ontario Court of Appeal also rejected the 
argument of the Crown that section 1 of the Charter could be invoked to 
save this provision, noting that the Crown conceded that it faces a very 
significant onus in trying to save any impugned provision under section 
1 if it is found to violate section 7 of the Charter.47 
While the outcome of the constitutional challenge was the same in 
the Ontario and Quebec Court of Appeal decisions, the Ontario judgment 
is narrower, both in its scope and in its analysis. The Ontario Court 
recognized that the 2004 decision of the Supreme Court in Canadian 
Foundation for Children48 had an impact on how section 7 of the 
Charter should be applied. As noted by the Ontario Court of Appeal, the 
Supreme Court held that in deciding what constitutes a principle of 
fundamental justice, consideration must be given both to the “traditions 
that [establish] the basic norms for how the state deals with its citizens” 
and to international law.49 The Ontario Court concluded that both of 
these factors support the principle that young offenders are to be treated 
differently from adults, and place a burden on the Crown to justify the 
imposition of an adult sentence. 
The Supreme Court decision in Canadian Foundation for Children,50 
however, rejected the argument that the “best interests of the child” is a 
Charter-protected principle of fundamental justice. This clearly calls 
into question the fourth principle of fundamental justice articulated by the 
Quebec Court of Appeal, that the “youth justice system must consider 
the best interests” of a young offender. However, as noted above, 
although that principle was articulated by the Quebec Court of Appeal, 
it was not relied upon by that Court in its constitutional analysis, nor 
was it even mentioned by the Ontario Court of Appeal. 
The caution of the Ontario Court in not endorsing all of the Quebec 
Court’s analysis reflects an appreciation of the significance of the 
                                                                                                            
46
 R. v. B. (D.), [2006] O.J. No. 1112, 37 C.R. (6th) 265, at para. 35 (Ont. C.A.); see also 
para. 68. 
47
 R. v. B. (D.), [2006] O.J. No. 1112, 37 C.R. (6th) 265, at paras. 81-83 (Ont. C.A.). 
48
 Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada, [2004] S.C.J. No. 6, 
[2004] 1 S.C.R. 76 (S.C.C.). 
49
 R. v. B. (D.), [2006] O.J. No. 1112, 37 C.R. (6th) 265, at para. 52 (Ont. C.A.), quoting 
from para. 8 of the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth 
and the Law, [2004] S.C.J. No. 6, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76 (S.C.C.). 
50
 Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada, [2004] S.C.J. No. 6, 
[2004] 1 S.C.R. 76 (S.C.C.). 
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Supreme Court decision in Canadian Foundation for Children,51 and 
may reflect a desire to dissociate itself from some of the expansive 
discussion in the Quebec decision about the interpretation of the sentencing 
provisions of the YCJA52 in a way that is consistent with the “best 
interests” of the child. 
(d) The Supreme Court and the Convention 
The Supreme Court of Canada has granted the Crown leave to appeal 
R. v. B. (D.);53 the appeal was argued in October 2007 and a decision is 
expected some time in 2008. While there is always risk in predicting how 
the Supreme Court will resolve a controversial issue, previous decisions 
of the Supreme Court appear more consistent with the approach of the 
Ontario Court of Appeal. At very least, it is clear that the Supreme Court 
accepts the Convention on the Rights of the Child54 as an important part of 
international law that should be used to help interpret and apply both 
Canada’s youth justice laws and the Charter. It would further appear that 
the Court is sympathetic to the argument that Canada’s young offenders 
should be treated differently from adults. 
In its 2004 decision in Canadian Foundation for Children,55 the 
Supreme Court dealt with a Charter-based challenge to section 43 of the 
Criminal Code,56 a provision which allows parents to use “reasonable 
force” for the purposes of correction. In the majority judgment of 
McLachlin C.J.C., it is clear that she considers the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child57 to be highly significant to the interpretation of 
section 7 of the Charter. In October of 2005 in R. v. C. (R.),58 the 
Supreme Court held that youth status is a factor that may be taken into 
account when a court is deciding whether, pursuant to Criminal Code 
section 487.051(2), to order a DNA sample from a youth found guilty of 
an offence, even in the absence of any explicit provision to this effect in 
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either the Code or the YCJA59 Writing for a majority of the Court, Fish J. 
noted that the Preamble of the YCJA specifically acknowledges that 
Canada is a party to the Convention, and commented on the importance 
of international law in defining the rights of youth: 
In creating a separate criminal justice system for young persons, 
Parliament has recognized the heightened vulnerability and reduced 
maturity of young persons. In keeping with its international obligations, 
Parliament has sought as well to extend to young offenders enhanced 
procedural protections, and to interfere with their personal freedom 
and privacy as little as possible: see the United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of the Child … incorporated by reference in the Y.C.J.A.60  
(emphasis added) 
In December 2005 in R. v. D. (C.),61 the Supreme Court of Canada 
interpreted the concept of “violent offence” in section 39(1)(a) of the 
YCJA62 in a way that restricts the use of custody for young offenders, 
concluding that this provision could not be invoked to sentence to 
custody a youth who was found guilty of dangerous driving in a stolen 
vehicle after a high-speed police chase. Writing for a majority of the 
Court, Bastarache J. again referred to the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child63 as an “important” instrument for intepreting the YCJA,64 suggesting 
that the Court may give significant weight to the Convention in dealing 
with adult sentencing as well. 
These decisions all support the view that the Court will be influenced 
by the Convention on the Rights of the Child65 in interpreting the 
Charter, and seems likely to be sympathetic to the argument that there is 
constitutional justification for a presumption that youth should be treated 
differently from adults. 
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(e) Responding to Serious Youth Offending in a Constitutionally 
Acceptable Way 
Some adolescents commit very violent crimes; their impulsiveness, 
lack of foresight and limited moral development can result in callous, 
senseless acts that have tragic consequences and understandably shock 
the community. Fortunately, these acts are relatively rare; however, the 
relative infrequency of these acts, and their sometimes brutal nature, 
contribute to the heightened media and public attention they receive when 
they do occur. There are youths, few in number, who have committed the 
most serious offences, and for whom accountability and protection of the 
public may require an adult length of sentence, and perhaps even a lifetime 
in custody. 
It must, however, be appreciated that adolescents who end up serving 
all, or a portion, of their sentences in adult correctional facilities may pose 
a greater risk of re-offending than those who serve their entire sentences 
in the youth system.66 Further, the limited moral and psychological 
development of adolescents requires that the justice system should hold 
them less accountable than adults who commit the same offences. This 
suggests that the legal regime for young offenders should reserve  
an adult sentence for exceptional cases, and should place an onus on  
the prosecution to justify this type of sanction. Placing an onus on the 
prosecution to justify an adult sentence seems most consistent with 
Canada’s obligations under international law and the Charter. 
The unfortunate reality is that those youths who commit the most 
serious and senseless crimes are precisely those who lack foresight and 
judgment, and who will not likely be deterred by adult sentences. Adult 
sentencing for the most violent of young offenders may be justified on 
accountability principles, but it will not produce a safer society. A reduction 
in serious violent offending cannot be achieved by a “legislative quick fix”, 
but rather requires a resource-intensive combination of preventative, 
enforcement and rehabilitative services. 
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2. Police Stops for a “Chit Chat”: Detention and Search 
While there is controversy about the extent of racial profiling by police, 
there is no doubt that “age profiling” frequently occurs: adolescents are 
much more likely to be stopped by the police than are adults.67 This may 
in part reflect the fact that youth are more likely to be out at night on  
the streets and in other “high crime” public places, but there is also 
undoubtedly a degree of stereotyping by police, who are aware that criminal 
activity peaks in late adolescence and early adulthood. While age profiling 
may result in police apprehending some youth offenders, it also results 
in the harassment of many innocent youth and increases youth distrust 
of the police. Further, this police action may result in unconstitutional 
searches and questioning of youth by police. 
The concerns about violations of the rights of youth as a result of 
police practices are illustrated by the Ontario case of R. v. D. (J.).68 At 
about 11 p.m. one night in December 2004, two Toronto police officers 
observed three visible-minority youths wearing dark baggy clothes walking 
down the street in a “high crime area”. The police decided to stop the 
youths for what they referred to as a “chit chat”. The officers had no basis 
for stopping these youths, and were not investigating a crime, but rather 
did this as part of “proactive policing in a high crime area”. The officers 
stopped the boys and said something like: “Guys, stop for a second, we 
want to talk to you.” They asked the boys their names and birth dates, and 
did a Canadian Police Information Centre (“C.P.I.C”) search, discovering 
that one of the youths was in violation of the terms of his bail conditions. 
The police then arrested this youth, searched him and found him in 
possession of a replica handgun. They then arrested and searched the other 
two youths, and found various items including a crowbar in a knapsack 
carried by one of them. All three were initially charged with possession 
of burglary tools, though the Crown withdrew charges against the youth 
who did not have any items on his person or in his knapsack. 
At a voir dire on the admissibility of the items seized, the police 
acknowledged that the boys were not told that they could refuse to 
respond to questions. The youth who was not on bail testified that he 
was “frequently” stopped and questioned by the police, once or twice a 
week, and that he did not feel that he was free to leave, nor did he feel 
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that he had any option but to answer the officers’ questions. One of the 
officers testified: 
that it was his practice to ask an individual’s name and birth date when 
he was “investigating” them. In cross examination he agreed that in 
this situation, he was “investigating” the three boys for being in the 
area. “My suspicion was based on the circumstances which I explained 
to you before: the late hour, the fact that they were all dressed in black, 
the fact that they were all youths. My suspicion was that they were up 
to — let me put it rashly — no good.”69 
(emphasis added) 
This statement reflects common police attitudes, but is also quite 
astonishing. Imagine if the officer admitted that a reason for stopping the 
youths was not their age, but their race! Justice Jones concluded that the 
police had not violated the Charter rights of the youth who was in violation 
of the terms of his bail order and had possession of a replica handgun. 
Regarding the other youth, she concluded that there had been a violation 
of his rights under both section 8 (to be free from “unreasonable search”) 
and section 9 (“unlawful detention”). In the course of ruling that the  
admission of the evidence obtained would bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute and hence should be excluded under section 24(2) 
of the Charter, she placed significant emphasis on the fact that the case 
involved youth: 
 The practice by the police of obtaining identifying personal 
information from individuals, especially young people, where no crime 
is being investigated and there are no reasonable grounds to detain, 
with the intention of conducting a C.P.I.C. search …without explaining 
to that person his right to refuse to provide that information or the 
jeopardy he or she faces by providing that information, amounts, in 
my opinion, to an abuse of police powers. This is particularly concerning 
when one considers that young persons, who are typically the target  
of these policing practices, have been granted enhanced procedural 
protections … under the Youth Criminal Justice Act because of their 
age and stage of development. ... 
 … [T]he constitutional violation occasioned by the arbitrary 
detention of J.D. was significant. In reaching that assessment, I bear in 
mind not only the direct impact on the rights of J.D. of “pro-active 
policing”, but the potential impact on the constitutional rights of the 
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indeterminate number of young people who may have been subjected 
to the same arbitrary detention and questioning in the name of this 
police initiative … 
 Most importantly, the significance of … institutional failures, in 
assessing police conduct, particularly where an institutional policy 
effectively drives a pattern of legal non-compliance, cannot be 
underestimated …70  
(emphasis added) 
Youth are particularly vulnerable to police harassment as they are 
often unaware of their rights, are easily intimidated by the police and are 
frequently in public places. Decisions like R. v. D. (J.)71 are important, 
as they provide constitutional protections for the integrity of youth while 
they are walking down the street. Some aspects of the analysis of Jones J. 
in D. (J.) may have to be reassessed in light of the recent Ontario Court of 
Appeal decision in R. v. B. (L.).72 While a full analysis of that controversial 
appellate decision is beyond the scope of this paper (and appears elsewhere 
in this volume), that decision would suggest that police may have a “chat” 
with a youth that may include asking the youth for name and birth date 
while a C.P.I.C. check is being run without the youth being “detained” 
under section 9 of the Charter. It is, however, submitted that B. (L.) can 
be distinguished from D. (J.), as the youth in D. (J.) did testify and 
explain that when he was stopped by the police, he felt “psychologically 
detained”, while the youth in B. (L.) did not testify at the voir dire and 
actually approached the officers to strike up a conversation . It is also 
important to note that in B. (L.) Moldaver J.A. accepted that youth 
should be a factor in deciding whether detention occurred: 
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 The respondent’s conduct in approaching the officers hardly fits 
the image of a frightened youth who felt psychologically compelled to 
submit to the police in deprivation of his liberty. On the contrary, it 
speaks to a street-wise teenager who quickly sized up the situation and 
determined that his best defence in the circumstances was a strong 
offence. Put simply, this was not a case of psychological compulsion 
exerted by the police; it was a case of psychological control attempted 
by the respondent.73 
(emphasis added) 
The ultimate outcome in B. (L.) may well be justifiable, in particular its 
application of section 24(2) of the Charter to a situation where a loaded 
handgun was seized from a youth on school property. It is, however, 
submitted that in dealing with the issue of whether detention of a youth 
has occurred, B. (L.) should not be extended to cases in which the police 
have stopped a youth. Otherwise, there will be an invitation to police to 
stop and question an “indeterminate number of [innocent] young people” 
undermining the respect of youth for the justice system and the rules of 
society. Further, it is submitted that in applying section 24(2), courts should 
take into account that the person whose rights were violated is a youth. 
3. Police Investigations and Questioning: Statutory and 
Constitutional Rights 
Parliament, recognizing the vulnerability of youth, enacted various 
provisions of the YCJA74 to provide youths who are arrested with 
significant rights and protections that are not afforded to adults. As soon 
as a youth is arrested, the police75 must inform the youth of the right to 
consult a lawyer.76 Further, section 146(2) of the YCJA (and before that 
the YOA77 section 56(2)) provides that if a statement of a youth to the 
police is to be admitted in evidence, there is an onus on the Crown to 
establish on the balance of probabilities that the questioning police officer 
gave the youth a clear explanation of his or her rights. This includes an 
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explanation of the right to silence, and the right to consult and have present 
during questioning a parent and a lawyer, as well as an explanation of 
the fact that any statement made by the youth may be used in evidence 
at trial. The explanation must be in language “appropriate to the youth’s 
age and understanding”. If any rights are to be waived, especially if 
there is waiver of the right to counsel: “Not only must the waiver be 
clear and unequivocal, but [the youth’s] understanding must also be full 
and complete.”78 If a youth expresses a wish to contact a lawyer, police 
must cease questioning the youth and use reasonable efforts to assist the 
youth in contacting a lawyer.79 
The statutory rights afforded youths at the time of questioning by 
the police under the YCJA80 section 146(2) are significantly broader than 
the rights afforded under the Charter, and the onus is on the Crown to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the youth was given an adequate 
explanation of his or her rights, and that the statement was voluntary. 
Further, the Crown must establish on the balance of probabilities the 
validity of any waiver of rights under section 146(4),81 and a violation of 
section 146(2) will result in the exclusion of the statement unless there 
was a mere “technical irregularity”. By way of contrast, if a Charter breach 
is alleged, the onus is on the youth to establish a violation on the balance of 
probabilities, and even if there is a breach, the statement may still be 
admitted if doing so would not bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute. 
For these reasons, although there is a great deal of case law in which 
youth challenge the admissibility of statements made by them to “persons 
in authority”, most cases are argued under the YCJA82 and the common 
law voluntariness standard. There are, however, some important cases 
involving youth and a violation of the Charter rights by police during 
questioning of a youth. Most notable is the 1993 Supreme Court decision 
in R. v. I. (L.R.),83 where the Supreme Court took account of the “young 
offender context” in interpreting section 10 of the Charter and ruled 
inadmissible two confessions to a police officer made by a youth in regard 
to a homicide. Of significance for present purposes, the Court held that 
                                                                                                            
78
 R. v. K. (O.), [2004] B.C.J. No. 1458, at para. 96 (B.C. Youth. Ct.), per McKinnon Yth. Ct. J. 
79
 R. v. B. (D.R.), [2004] B.C.J. No. 1092 (B.C. Youth Ct.). 
80
 S.C. 2002, c. 1. 
81
 R. v. H. (L.T.), [2006] N.S.J. No. 409 (N.S.C.A.), leave to appeal allowed, [2006] S.C.C.A. 
No. 509 (S.C.C.). 
82
 S.C. 2002, c. 1. 
83
 [1993] S.C.J. No. 132, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 504 (S.C.C.). 
(2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) YOUTH AS VICTIMS AND OFFENDERS 613 
if a youth faces a very serious charge, his waiver of the right to counsel 
guaranteed by section 10 of the Charter is valid only if the “young person 
is aware of the consequences of his or her actions, including the possibility 
of being raised to adult court”.84 This Supreme Court decision clearly 
recognized the special vulnerability of youth, imposing obligations on the 
police to give youths charged with the most serious offences and facing 
the possibility of an adult sanction a special caution. 
There have also been a few cases that have raised Charter issues 
concerning police investigative practices regarding youths in situations 
where a violation of the Charter resulted in the police obtaining physical 
evidence implicating the youth. In R. v. R. (G.M.)85 the Nova Scotia 
Court of Appeal, citing R. v. I. (L.R.),86 upheld a youth court decision 
that excluded fingerprint evidence obtained after a violation of the youth’s 
right to consult counsel. While the youth consulted with his mother, the 
Court emphasized that he also had the right to consult counsel, and this 
right was “crucial” and “distinct” from the right to consult with a parent, 
and was not waived. 
In R. v. A. (A.),87 the Court considered the admissibility of evidence 
obtained by the police after entry into an apartment occupied by four 
youths. The police knocked on the door and asked to be admitted, and one 
of the youths let them in without comment. The officers questioned the 
youths, without advising them of their rights, extensively searched the 
apartment and seized an item that was physical evidence of criminal 
negligence causing bodily injury, the criminal act under investigation. 
Justice Flaherty emphasized that the youths were not aware of their rights, 
and no effort was made to contact their parents. He ruled that the entry 
was unlawful and violated section 8 of the Charter: 
 To waive a constitutionally protected right it’s trite law that you 
have to be aware of the right to and of the consequences of, consenting 
or refusing. If you’re consenting there has to be clear and cogent 
evidence of that consent. Mere acquiescence is not consent. On these 
facts consent to enter these premises was never sought. In any event, it 
wasn’t given, or acquiesced in.88 
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Invoking section 24(2) to rule the evidence inadmissible, Flaherty J. noted 
that there were no “exigent circumstances” that justified a warrantless 
entry, and no effort to obtain the permission of a parent or guardian for 
entry into the apartment and for conducting a search. 
In cases involving the obtaining of breathalyzer samples, however, 
the courts have not been very sympathetic to the argument that special 
protections should be afforded youths under the Charter section 10. In 
R. v. E. (G.), Ross J. observed: 
 I am also not satisfied that [a] … case in which a young driver faces 
a charge of driving while his blood-alcohol content was in excess of 
the legislated level, requires extraordinary measures to protect the 
constitutional rights of young persons. It is not the same situation as 
where a young person is being questioned by the authorities. In that 
situation … both Parliament and the courts have recognized the need 
for special protection for youths. On the other hand, when it comes to 
driving offences and the provision of breath samples, neither Parliament 
nor the courts have granted special rights to young persons.89 
Leaving aside the breathalyzer cases, the courts have recognized the 
vulnerability of youth when youths are being investigated for crimes. 
Although the jurisprudence reveals a degree of vagueness in the weight 
to be given to this factor, police are expected to afford greater respect for 
the Charter rights of youth, or the Crown may find that wrongfully obtained 
evidence will be excluded. 
4. A Youth’s Sense of Time: Trial within a “Reasonable Time” 
(Charter Section 11(b)) 
Parliament and the courts have recognized that adolescents have a 
“different sense of time” than adults. The courts have accepted that youth 
is a factor to take into account in applying the Charter section 11(b) 
guarantee to the right to a trial within a reasonable time. In the 1991 Ontario 
Court of Appeal decision in R. v. M. (G.C.), a case decided under the 
YOA,90 Osbourne J.A. stated: 
 In my opinion, the general principles set out in Askov … apply to 
young offenders. There is a particular need to conclude youth court 
proceedings without unreasonable delay, consistent with the goals of the 
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Young Offenders Act and the principles upon which it is based. I do not, 
however, view young persons as being entitled to a special constitutional 
guarantee to trial within a reasonable time, which differs in substance 
from that available to adults. Nonetheless, it seems to me that, as general 
proposition, youth court proceedings should proceed to a conclusion 
more quickly than those in the adult criminal justice system. Delay, 
which may be reasonable in the adult criminal justice system, may not 
be reasonable in the youth court. There are sound reasons for this. 
They include the well-established fact that the ability of a young person 
to appreciate the connection between behaviour and its consequences 
is less developed than an adult’s. For young persons, the effect of time 
may be distorted. If treatment is required … it is best begun with as 
little delay as is possible. 91  
(emphasis added) 
Since that decision was rendered, the YCJA92 was enacted, with section 
3(1)(b) specifying that: 
(b) the criminal justice system for young persons must be separate from 
that of adults and emphasize the following… 
(iv) timely intervention that reinforces the link between the offending 
behaviour and its consequences, and 
(v) the promptness and speed with which persons responsible for 
enforcing this Act must act, given young persons’ perception of 
time; 
There have been more recent appellate judgments which have held 
that this provision was intended to “simply codify and make explicit 
what was recognized in the earlier jurisprudence”, in particular R. v. M. 
(G.C.),93 and have reversed youth court decisions that ordered a stay.94 
While status as a youth is clearly only one factor in deciding whether to 
issue a stay, there have also been cases in which this would appear to 
have been the decisive factor. In the brief 2005 decision R. v. H. (M.),95 
the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the order of the youth court judge to 
issue a stay almost two years after charges had been laid, observing that 
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after one year, “the case was already pushing the limits of what could be 
considered reasonable for the trial of a young person on what appeared 
to be relatively uncomplicated charges. It was incumbent on the system 
to give this case some priority.”96 In its decision, the Court of Appeal 
noted that “memories fade over time”. Although not explicitly mentioned 
by the Court, it is notable that memories of children and youths fade more 
quickly than for adults.97 While the courts have recognized youth as a 
factor in section 11(b) cases, it would be helpful to have a clearer 
articulation of the weight to be given this factor, and it would be appropriate 
for this factor to be given significant weight. 
5. Youth in Schools: Less Respect for Rights 
While the courts have been especially protective of the Charter 
rights of youth when they are being dealt with by the police, a concern 
about the “well-being” of children has resulted in courts significantly 
reducing the rights afforded to youth when they are subject to search 
and questioning by school officials, who are also a class of state agents. 
The leading case on the restricted protections afforded youth in 
school is the Supreme Court decision in R. v. M. (M.R.).98 A junior high 
school vice-principal received information from other students that the 
accused, a 13-year-old student, intended to sell drugs at a school dance. 
When, in response to questioning at the vice-principal’s office, the youth 
denied that he was in possession of drugs, the vice-principal then searched 
the youth. Pursuant to school policy, a plain clothes police officer had 
been called by the vice-principal, and was present but said nothing while 
the vice-principal spoke to the youth and searched him. The vice-principal 
seized a cellophane bag containing marijuana and gave it to the constable, 
who advised the accused that he was under arrest for possession of a 
narcotic. The youth court judge found that the search violated the youth’s 
rights under section 8 of the Charter and excluded the evidence, resulting 
in the acquittal of the youth. The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal ruled that 
the trial judge had erred in excluding this evidence, a conclusion affirmed 
by the Supreme Court of Canada. 
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While in R. v. M. (M.R.)99 the Supreme Court accepted that the 
vice-principal was an agent of the state, and was obliged to comply with 
section 8 of the Charter in conducting a search, it also ruled that a 
school official did not have to meet the standards of a police officer for 
the conduct of the search. A school official has significant leeway in 
determining what constitutes “reasonable grounds” for a search, and 
does not require a warrant to search a student, as long as the official is 
not acting as “an agent for the police”. In this case, even though a police 
officer was present during the search, the Court concluded that the vice-
principal was not “an agent of the police”. The Court gave school officials 
significant authority to enforce the rules of the school, even when their 
acts resulted in the seizure of evidence for use in a criminal prosecution. 
Justice Cory emphasized the important role of teachers and schools for 
youth and society: 
Teachers and those in charge of our schools are entrusted with the care 
and education of our children. It is difficult to imagine a more important 
trust or duty. To ensure the safety of the students and to provide them with 
the orderly environment so necessary to encourage learning, reasonable 
rules of conduct must be in place and enforced at schools.100 
The Court then concluded that, in order to allow school officials to 
effectively discharge their duties, it is necessary to give them a broader 
set of powers than those afforded the police. Accordingly, the rights of 
youth in dealing with those officials are restricted in comparison with 
the rights that they have in their dealings with police: 
[T]eachers and principals must be able to act quickly to protect their 
students and to provide the orderly atmosphere required for learning. 
If a teacher were told that a student was carrying a dangerous weapon 
or sharing a dangerous prohibited drug the parents of all the other 
students at the school would expect the teacher to search that student. 
The role of teachers is such that they must have the power to search. 
… It follows that their expectation of privacy will be lessened while 
they attend school… This reduced expectation of privacy coupled with 
the need to protect students and provide a positive atmosphere for 
learning clearly indicate that a more lenient and flexible approach 
should be taken to searches conducted by teachers and principals than 
would apply to searches conducted by the police.101 
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Thus, youth who are in a school have more restricted Charter rights 
when being questioned or searched by school officials. However, if the 
police lead an investigation in a school, they generally are obliged to 
afford youth the same rights as they would in other settings, as illustrated 
by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. M. (A.).102 A high school principal 
told the local police that they could bring sniffer dogs into the school to 
search for drugs whenever a dog was available. Two years after the general 
invitation, but without a specific request to attend that day, three police 
officers and a sniffer dog arrived at the school and asked for and obtained 
permission from the principal “to go through the school”. Neither the 
police nor the principal had specific reason to believe that there were 
drugs in the school that day. Students were confined in classrooms for 
up to two hours while the police conducted a search with the dog. After 
the students’ lockers were searched, the police and the dog went to the 
school gym, where the dog reacted to a backpack lying next to a wall. A 
police officer searched the backpack and found marijuana and psilocybin. 
The owner of the backpack, a student, was charged with possession of 
drugs for the purpose of trafficking. The youth court judge concluded 
that there had been a violation of section 8 of the Charter and excluded 
the evidence under section 24(2), observing: “the rights of every student in 
the school were violated that day as they were all subject to an unreasonable 
search.” 103 The Court of Appeal affirmed this decision, concluding that 
the sniffing by the dog constituted a search. Further, this was a search 
by police, but: 
[E]ven if this was a search by school authorities through the agency of 
the police, there is nothing in the Education Act … that gives the 
required authority to conduct such a search … ‘To admit the evidence 
is effectively to strip A.M. and any other student in a similar situation 
of the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.’104 
A Crown appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was argued on May 22, 
2007, with a decision reserved. If the Supreme Court reverses the Court 
of Appeal, it will mean that students could be subjected to random 
searches by the police or teachers any time that they are at school. 
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III. CHILDREN AND YOUTH AS VICTIMS AND WITNESSES 
1. Special Protections for Child and Youth Witnesses 
In a series of amendments to the Criminal Code105 and the Canada 
Evidence Act106 between 1988 and 2006,107 Parliament enacted a number 
of provisions to facilitate the giving of evidence by persons under the 
age of 18, including legislation allowing youth to testify via closed-circuit 
television or from behind a screen, to have a support person sit near 
them while they testify, and to admit into evidence a videotape of a prior 
interview with the youth. Most recently, the competency test for child 
witnesses has been substantially reformed, abolishing any inquiry into 
whether a child can demonstrate understanding of the promise to tell the 
truth, and creating a presumption of competency for children. The Supreme 
Court of Canada and lower courts have consistently rejected constitutional 
challenges to these provisions by accused persons, recognizing that they 
are constitutionally justified by the special vulnerability of youth and the 
desire to promote the search for the truth. In upholding the constitutionality 
of the provision allowing a child to testify from behind a screen in 1993, 
L’Heureux-Dubé J., writing for a unanimous Supreme Court in R. v. 
Levogiannis, observed: 
 The plight of children who testify and the role courts must play in 
ascertaining the truth must not be overlooked in the context of the 
constitutional analysis in the case at hand. As this Court has said, children 
may require different treatment than adults in the courtroom setting. ...108 
Accordingly, the Court upheld the constitutionality of this provision, which 
at that time allowed a judge to permit a child under the age of 18 to 
testify outside the courtroom in cases involving specified sexual offences, 
provided that the judge was satisfied that this was “necessary in order 
for the child to give a full and candid account of the acts complained of”. 
The Court rejected arguments by the accused that this violated his right to 
a fair trial, as guaranteed by sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter. In 
                                                                                                            
105 
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
106 
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5. 
107 
See discussion in Nicholas Bala, “Double Victims: Child Sexual Abuse and the Criminal 
Justice System” (1990) 15 Queen’s L.J. 3; Nicholas Bala, “Increasing Protections for Women and 
Children: Bills C-126 & 128” (1993) 21 C.R. (4th) 365; and Nicholas Bala, Katherine Duvall-
Antonacopoulos, Rod Lindsay, Kang Lee & Victoria Talwar, “Bill C-2: A New Law for Canada’s 
Child Witnesses” (2006) 32 C.R. (6th) 48.  
108
 [1993] S.C.J. No. 70, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 475, at para. 15 (S.C.C.). For a similar American 
decision, see Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990). 
620 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
coming to this conclusion, the Court accepted that there must be some 
“balancing” of the rights of accused persons and the interests of children: 
 Section 486(2.1) of the Criminal Code has been carefully worded 
to protect the rights of accused, while at the same time facilitating the 
giving of evidence by young victims of sexual abuse of varying kinds. … 
 Parliament has devised s. 486(2.1) in such a way as to properly 
balance the goal of ascertaining the truth and the protection of children 
as well as the rights of accused to a fair trial by allowing cross-
examination and by tailoring the use of screens to the complainants’ 
age and confining their use to limited and specific types of crimes.109 
The 2006 enactment, section 486.2(1) of the Criminal Code,110 
considerably expanded the scope of this provision, stipulating that if an 
application is made by prosecutor or child, the judge “shall” make an order 
to allow the child to testify from behind a screen or via closed-circuit 
television, “unless the judge ... is of the opinion that the order would 
interfere with the proper administration of justice”. This statutory exception 
is narrow,111 and might, for example, be invoked if the equipment available 
did not give the accused, judge and jury a good view of the child, or if 
there was inadequate provision for private communication between 
the accused and his or her counsel. Significantly, there is no longer a 
requirement for the Crown to establish that use of this provision is 
necessary for a child to give a “full and candid account of the acts 
complained of”.112 The constitutionality of the new provision was upheld 
by Dhillon Prov. Ct. J. in R. v. H. (C.N.),113 where she observed that 
“there is a valid legislative basis for requiring the presumptive or mandatory 
order, given the lack of success in affording aids to child witnesses 
under the predecessor legislation.” She concluded that this provision was 
consistent with the rights of an accused to a fair trial, as the court retained 
the authority to decline to use a screen or closed-circuit television if 
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doing so would “interfere with the proper administration of justice”. While 
the 2006 provision is significantly broader than the original provision, 
which was upheld by the Supreme Court in 1993 in R. v. Levogiannis,114 
it seems highly likely that higher courts will follow the approach of 
Dhillon Prov. Ct. J. in R. v. H. (C.N.) and uphold the constitutionality of 
the new provision.115 
In its 1993 decision in R. v. L. (D.O.),116 the Supreme Court of Canada 
upheld the constitutional validity of section 715.1, which allowed for a 
court to admit a video-recording of an investigative interview with a child 
about a sexual offence, provided that the child testified and adopted the 
statements, and was therefore available for cross-examination. Chief 
Justice Lamer recognized the vulnerability of children and youth, and 
their dominance by adults, and concluded that the provision was: 
a response to the dominance and power which adults, by virtue of  
their age, have over children. Accordingly, s. 715.1 is designed to 
accommodate the needs and to safeguard the interests of young victims of 
various forms of sexual abuse, irrespective of their sex. By allowing for 
the videotaping of evidence under certain express conditions, s. 715.1 
not only makes participation in the criminal justice system less stressful 
and traumatic for child and adolescent complainants, but also aids in the 
preservation of evidence and the discovery of truth.117 
As with other child witness-related provisions, section 715.1 was amended 
in 2006 to apply to any offence, and to create a presumption that a video-
recording will be admitted into evidence, unless the court is “of the  
opinion that admission of the video-recording … would interfere with 
the proper administration of justice”. Although there are no reported 
decisions on the constitutionality of this new provision, it seems likely 
that it too will be considered to be consistent with the Charter, even 
though this would involve an extension of the reasoning of L. (D.O.). 
Until 2006, a young child was permitted to testify only if the court 
was satisfied that the child understood the significance of the “promise 
to tell the truth” and had the “ability to communicate the evidence”.118  
In 2006 Canada Evidence Act section 16.1 came into force, creating a 
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presumption that all witnesses “have the capacity to testify”. While 
children are required to “promise to tell the truth” before being permitted 
to testify, section 16.1(8) specifies that no child shall be “asked  any 
questions regarding their understanding of the nature of the promise 
to tell the truth for the purpose of determining whether their evidence 
shall be received by the court”. A party who is challenging the competence 
of a child to testify bears the onus of satisfying that there is a genuine 
issue about the child’s ability to communicate in court, and if there is an 
inquiry, the sole test for competence is whether the child is “able to 
understand and respond to questions”.119 Trial courts have held that the 
new process and test for assessing the competence of child witnesses in 
the 2006 law are consistent with the rights of an accused to a fair trial, 
and with the principles of fundamental justice. In rejecting a Charter 
challenge to the new provision, Antifaev Prov. Ct. J. reviewed the 
psychological research that supported the enactment of the new law, and 
concluded: “The question really is not whether the child understands the 
duty of telling the truth or can articulate that duty, but whether the child 
is in fact telling the truth.”120 
The decisions upholding the constitutionality of the criminal laws that 
afford child and youth witnesses special protections reflect the fact that 
the courts recognize the unique and vulnerable nature of this stage of life, 
and are, in effect, prepared to afford it a special constitutional status. 
2. Correctional Use of Force — Lesser Protection within the Family 
Parents are given a broad range of powers at common law and under 
legislation to make decisions affecting their children and to control their 
lives. Further, it has been accepted that under the Charter, some parental 
rights are aspects of a parent’s “security of the person”, and hence entitled 
to constitutional protection, in particular when the state is threatening a 
parental relationship with a child in protection proceedings.121 It has also 
been accepted by the courts that children have a constitutional right to 
“liberty and security of the person”, which they may assert in some 
situations in their own capacity. Accordingly, both parents and children 
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have the right to have state intervention under child welfare laws only 
“in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice”. It is only once a 
court has determined that the state has proven that there is sufficient 
evidence of parental abuse, neglect or incapacity that the constitutional 
rights of children and their parents may start to diverge in a child 
welfare proceeding. There are some situations in which the rights of 
children and parents must be balanced against each other, as illustrated 
by Canadian Foundation for Children.122 This 2004 decision of the 
Supreme Court of Canada upheld the constitutional validity of section 
43 of the Criminal Code,123 which allows parents to use reasonable force 
on children “for the purpose of correction”. The Court observed that 
section 7 of the Charter can only be invoked when a state action curtails 
the liberty or security of the person of a child, so that a child could not, 
for example, invoke the Charter to bring a court application to compel 
parents to do something. However, the Court accepted that to the extent 
that parents are relying on a state-enforced legal regime to exercise 
powers over their children, the legal regime must be consistent with the 
Charter. The Supreme Court recognized that parents should be given a 
significant degree of autonomy to raise their children as they see fit. 
While accepting that children are clearly a “highly vulnerable group” 
and hence entitled to the protection of section 15 of the Charter, the 
majority of the Court also held that section 43 of the Criminal Code124 
corresponds to “actual needs and circumstances of children”, and hence 
does not “discriminate” against children.125 In coming to this conclusion, 
McLachlin C.J.C., writing for a majority of the Court, emphasized the 
importance of respecting the role and rights of parents to make decisions 
about how to raise their children. 
 Children need to be protected from abusive treatment. They are 
vulnerable members of Canadian society ... the government responds 
to the critical need of all children for a safe environment. Yet this is 
not the only need of children. Children also depend on parents ... for 
guidance and discipline, to protect them from harm and to promote 
their healthy development within society. A stable and secure family 
... is essential to this growth process. 
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 Section 43 is Parliament’s attempt to accommodate both of these 
needs. It provides parents and teachers with the ability to carry out the 
reasonable education of the child without the threat of sanction by the 
criminal law. The criminal law will decisively condemn and punish 
force that harms children … [but introducing] the criminal law into 
children’s families and educational environments in [non-abusive] 
circumstances would harm children more than help them. So Parliament 
has decided not to do so, preferring the approach of educating parents 
against physical discipline. 
 This decision, far from ignoring the reality of children’s lives, is 
grounded in their lived experience… The decision not to criminalize 
such conduct is not grounded in devaluation of the child, but in a concern 
that to do so risks ruining lives and breaking up families — a burden 
that in large part would be borne by children and outweigh any benefit 
derived from applying the criminal process.126 
Although affording constitutional recognition to some of the rights 
of parents, the Court did circumscribe the authority of parents, ruling 
that any corporal punishment that is used on a child could only result in 
“transitory and trifling” pain. While permitting teachers to use reasonable 
force to restrain a child or youth, the majority concluded that the 
“[c]ontemporary social consensus is that, while teachers may sometimes 
use corrective force to remove children from classrooms or secure 
compliance with instructions, the use of corporal punishment by teachers 
is not acceptable”.127 Further, the Supreme Court recognized that children 
and teenagers have different needs and capacities, and in some contexts 
should have different legal treatment, ruling that corporal punishment of 
teenagers by either parents or teachers is not protected by section 43 of 
the Criminal Code,128 although this provision can be invoked to use force 
to restrain or control a youth. 
The decision in Canadian Foundation for Children129 was 
controversial, with critics arguing that it gives insufficient protection to 
the rights and welfare of children and youth,130 and I share some of the 
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disappointment with the decision, in particular the dismissal of the 
notion that the “best interests of the child” is one of the “principles of 
fundamental justice”.131 It is, however, significant that the majority of 
the Court clearly recognized that childhood and youth are different from 
adulthood. While in this context this meant that there was a curtailment 
of protections otherwise afforded by the criminal law, the distinction 
was made because the Court believed that it would promote the interests 
of children and youth within their families and schools, and accordingly 
there may be other legal contexts in which this decision might be cited 
as the basis for an argument that the rights of youth should be protected. 
IV. CONCLUSION: THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF YOUTH 
Legislation and jurisprudence in Canada have recognized that those 
under the age of 18 are not adults and have a special legal status; this 
reflects their developmental stage and vulnerability, and is consistent 
with the Convention on the Rights of the Child.132 For some criminal law 
issues, most notably in regard to youthful offenders being dealt with by 
the police and youthful witnesses in the criminal courts, this is reflected 
in interpretations of the Charter which afford youth special protections. In 
other contexts, however, most notably in governing the relationship of 
youth to parents and teachers, the Charter has been interpreted in a way 
that affords youths fewer rights than adults, albeit with the judicially 
articulated intent of promoting the welfare of youth. 
Although often not well articulated by the courts, it is clear that 
Canadian courts, led by the Supreme Court, have in effect given 
constitutional recognition to the status of youth. As discussed in this 
paper, the future Supreme Court decision in R. v. B. (D.)133 will address 
the constitutionality of the provisions of the YCJA134 that presumptively 
impose an adult sentence on youth found guilty of the most serious 
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offences. I have argued that the approach most consistent with the existing 
jurisprudence and the Convention on the Rights of the Child135 will be 
for the Court to recognize the constitutionalization of youth, and rule 
invalid the challenged provisions. It is to be hoped that the Supreme 
Court will send a clear signal about the importance of youth as a factor 
in Charter analysis, and that its decision will eventually affect how other 
issues are dealt with by the courts. 
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